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I. INTRODUCTION

During 2008 and 2009, the world experienced the worst financial crisis since
the 1930s, along with the most severe global recession since World War II.
Unlike the Great Depression of the 1930s, when policy mistakes by central
bankers worsened and prolonged the financial and economic crisis, central banks
helped avoid systemic financial collapse during the recent crisis and lessened its
most malign economic consequences. While it was not uncommon for central
banks to cooperate in the 1920s and 1930s, their actions were very often
nationalistic or mutually competitive. By contrast, the extent of coordinated
efforts from 2008 has been unprecedented. Looking forward, experiences from
the latest global financial crisis present the potential for increased central bank
cooperation in the future, perhaps with formalization and legalization in certain
contexts (especially East Asia).
This Article begins with a discussion of the evolution of central banks,
focusing on those most historically significant in the global financial system: the
Bank of England, the U.S. Federal Reserve System, and the European Central
Bank and its principal forerunners. Following this discussion, the Article
considers the roles and functions of modem central banks, focusing on certain
unusual characteristics: namely, central banks are state entities responsible for
specific functions but have often been largely independent in pursuing those
objectives, both historically and in the modern era, which increasingly has seen
central bank governance given statutory independence. This makes central banks
unusual actors in international law and in their relations. They cooperate freely,
but in ways that are often informal and not addressed in formal international
arrangements. From this basis, the Article turns to the actions of the major central
banks in the context of the global financial crisis, including their extensive
coordination and cooperation. It concludes by considering whether experiences
during the latest major crisis set the stage for further development of central bank
cooperation mechanisms, focusing on specific areas of common international
concern.
II. EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKS

The term "central bank" was something of an ambiguous expression until the
late seventeenth century, as there was neither an agreed-upon definition of the
term nor a clear concept of what constituted "central bank" functions. The phrase
2
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found regular use only in the nineteenth century. R.S. Sayers, for example, in his
study of the Bank of England during its early years stated: "At the end of the
nineteenth century . . . 'central bank' meant scarcely more than a single bank
distinguished from others by unique public responsibilities eclipsing its
commercial interests."' Thus, the evolution of central banks is remarkable.
Today's entities are powerful in setting and managing domestic policies, with a
handful of central banks influential in the international arena, setting trends and
norms which other central banks often emulate.
In the delegation of authority to central banks by their governments, many of
the central banks of today are awarded a high degree of independence, a concept
considered in the following section. While modern observers argue that such
independence contributes heavily to general confidence and is essential to
domestic economic stability, early central banks enjoyed little such political and
economic latitude, and were often given poorly-defined objectives. Even today,
the specific functions of central banks can greatly vary from country to country.
Thus, the range of functions is largely dictated by the relationship between the
central bank and its government's policy objectives. Almeida, Fry, and Goodhart,
for example, have found that the monetary policies of a central bank are largely
determined by the exchange rate regime employed, given the state's general
fiscal stance.
The majority of central banks, as we know them today, emerged during the
nineteenth century. Some began informally within the commercial sector, acting
as neutral clearing houses for established banks. Banks such as the Swedish
Riksbank and the Bank of England were early models that showed the influence
that central banks could exert. Others (such as the Bank of France, established in
1800; Bank of the Netherlands in 1814; Bank of Spain in 1856; and Bank of
Japan in 1882) further exemplified the need for a state to have a centrally derived
source of monetary control.! The importance of a central bank was further
articulated at the International Financial Conference in Brussels in 1920, where it
was suggested that a central bank was necessary for a state to fulfill its economic
potential. The establishment of central banks such as the Bank of Australia in
1924, the Bank of Canada in 1935, and a large number of banks throughout
Africa and South America spoke to this perceived need. While some argue there
may be stages in economic development when the necessity of a central bank is
uncertain, nonetheless, central banks have become an essential element in both
the industrialized and developing world and in both existing and new states.
1. 1 R.S. SAYERS, THE BANK OF ENGLAND 1891-1944, at 1 (1976).
2. MAXWELL J. FRY, CHARLES A. E. GOODHART & ALVARO ALMEIDA, CENTRAL BANKING IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES AND INDEPENDENCE 27-32 (1996),
3. M.H. DE KOCK, CENTRAL BANKING 4-7 (4th ed., Crosby Lockwood Staples 1974). For a brief review
of the early history of central banking, see generally id. at 1-16.
4. Yann Decorzant, Univ. of Geneva, Dep't of Econ. History, Private and Public Initiatives in the
Economic and Financial Organizationof the League of Nations in the Early 1920's, 2007 EUR. Bus. HiST.
ASS'N 9-10, available at http://www.unige.ch/ses/istec/EBHA2007/papers/Decorzant.pdf.
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Maxfield cites an adage commonly heard in the international financial sector:
"'New nations acquire a flag, write a national anthem, and constitute a central
bank."
This Article now briefly examines the evolution of the Bank of England, the
Federal Reserve, and the European Central Bank as the three main central banks
that have taken visible leadership roles in combating the global financial crisis.
A. Bank of England
The Bank of England (BOE) was founded in 1694 by William Paterson, who
gathered a group of London businessmen together for the purpose of raising and
lending f1,200,000 to the government in return for a royal charter and associated
privileges.6 Although the Bank ultimately grew into the model of modern central
banking we know today, its origin did not reflect that of a central bank and
differed considerably from its continental counterparts. Where the continental
banks were directly involved in credit and finance throughout their respective
countries, the BOE differed in that it was a private bank which had little
functional involvement in commercial lending in the United Kingdom, and had
few branches, either in London or elsewhere. In terms of ordinary banking, there
were many other organizations whose activities dwarfed those of the BOE.
The Bank was born into a period of economic and political upheaval, with
the opulent lifestyles of the Stuart monarchs driving London into near
insolvency. The tax base was negligible, and the state had no effective means of
revenue collection. Further, high inflation through currency debasement was
ever-present, helping to create an economic climate that was precarious at best,
with crisis after crisis being the norm. The BOE was not initially intended to
function as a central bank, but was forged to meet the seemingly unending warfinancing needs of William III and other monarchs: "for most of the first 120
years of the Bank's existence the nation was either preparing for war, waging
war, or seeking retrenchment after war."' Thus the ongoing task of funding war
efforts defined the primary activities of the BOE in its early years, deepening the
government's dependency on the bank. This often resulted in the early renewals
of the bank's charter (with each renewal accompanied by further exclusive
privileges).' At that point the bank was considered part of the "public

5. SYLVIA MAXFIELD, GATEKEEPERS OF GROWTH: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CENTRAL BANKING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (1997).
6. Bank of England, About the Bank: Major Developments, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/
history/major developments2.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2010); See JOHN CARSWELL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE
(Sutton Pub., 2002) (1960).
7. H.V. Bowen, The Bank of England Duringthe Long Eighteenth Century, 1694-1820, in THE BANK OF
ENGLAND: MONEY, POWER AND INFLUENCE 1694-1994, at 5 (Richard Roberts & David Kynaston eds., 1995)
[hereinafter MONEY, POWER AND INFLUENCE].
8. For discussion of early corporate charters and their role, see Douglas Arner, Development of the
American Low of Corporationsto 1832, 55 SMU L. REV. 23 (2002).
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exchequer." It also established the norm of perpetual public lending to the
government, solidifying the idea of a continuing "national debt." Though there
were ongoing questions regarding the relationship between the Bank and the
crown-including the constitutionality of the BOE-its rising economic
importance cemented the case for a national central bank. In every sense, the
BOE became an essential driving force of empire.
In addition to funding military spending, the Bank acted as administrator for
government annuities, managed the national debt, and provided deposit and
credit arrangements for various government departments, among other functions:
"In these capacities the Bank made itself the cornerstone of the City and of
London's financial markets, and, as a prototype quasi-central bank, it had
developed a position of great influence well beyond the world of government
finance." 9 The Bank was also the de facto protector of the gold standard and
custodian of its own gold reserves, which assured the convertibility of sterling.
The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the Bank being given some of the
characteristics of modern central banks.'o The 1844 Bank Charter Act, for
example, granted exclusive note issuing rights which were tiedto the Bank's
gold reserves, and required a separation of note issuance from banking
operations. Further, by restricting English commercial banks from issuing notes,
the Act sought to address the inherent instability brought about by hbndreds of
country banks each issuing their own notes and frequently being unable toshonor
them, leading to frequent bank failures." Thus the Act granted monopoly power
to the BOE, solidifying its position as the new preeminent banking power within
the empire, in spite of the fact that it remained a private bank.
Both the influence and obligations of the Bank came under increased scrutiny
during the later part of the nineteenth century with the failure of Overend,
Gurney & Company. This was a London wholesale discount bank that had
established itself as a "banker's bank" after providing liquidity to other banks
during the crisis of 1825, cutting into both the BOE's profits and clients.
However, mismanagement at Overend, Gurney coincided with a general
tightening of credit and the bank became unable to meet its obligations. The
result was a general run on deposits, leading Overend, Gurney to seek assistance
from the BOE. The BOE had already determined that mismanagement had
carried Overend, Gurney into insolvency and therefore allowed the bank to fail,
in spite of the systemic risk presented. That risk was realized in the financial
crisis which followed, involving the failure of dozens of other banks and
companies. 2 The BOE, in essence, sent a message assaulting the moral hazard

9.

Bowen, supra note 7, at 11.

10. For further discussion, see CHRISTOs HADJIEMMANUIL, BANKING REGULATION AND THE BANK OF
ENGLAND (1996).
11.

PHILIP GEDDES, INSIDE THE BANK OF ENGLAND 24 (1987).

12. See Richard Roberts, The Bank of England and the City, in MONEY, POWER AND INFLUENCE, supra
note 7, at 157-159.
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associated with the "too big to fail" mantra. Regardless of size and importance,
any bank that became inappropriately managed could not look to the BOE to be
rescued.
However, the BOE did react in 1890 when Baring & Co quickly became
insolvent due to defaults on loans made to Argentinean borrowers." A crisis
ensued that threatened to overwhelm London's financial markets, endangering
the City's global reputation. London was faced with the prospect of a systemic
financial failure; the collapse of Baring would have been catastrophic. However,
Baring's liabilities were twice the reserves of the BOE. Faced with a crisis, the
BOE gathered support from other great banking names and provided liquidity for
both Baring and the market at large. The BOE was instrumental in facilitating the
continued functioning of the financial markets, moving closer to the traditional
model of a central bank.
The year 1914 initiated shifts in the central banking paradigm. The Federal
Reserve Act of 1913 took full effect, creating the infrastructure of the modem
U.S. payment and reserve system. The Act had significant global implications for
the direction which central banks would subsequently take as they continued to
evolve: "It was no less true in Britain, where, without benefit of law, the rotating,
part-time, amateur company of merchants that had managed the Bank of England
since 1694 was replaced by a full-time bureaucracy." 4 In addition, the outbreak
of World War I saw a practical joining between the Bank of England and the
Treasury, further solidifying the BOE's status as financier of the state. Having
left the gold standard in 1931, the Bank was nationalized as a public corporation
in 1946 and thereafter functioned fully as a central bank.
The Bank of England played a leading role during several crises of the last few
decades. The Bank was granted operational independence over monetary policy
in 1997, which gave it responsibility for monetary policy. During the global
financial crisis that began in 2007, the Bank operated as a lender of last resort,
supporting individual entities (such as Northern Rock) and the U.K. financial
markets. Its involvement as a leading global central bank has been vital during
the crisis, as it adjusts policy actions in coordination with the Federal Reserve,
the ECB and other important banks such as the Bank of Japan.

13. See Juan-Huitzi Flores, Lending Booms, Underwritingand Competition: The Baring Crisis Revisited
I (Univ. Carlos 111 De Madrid, Working Papers in Economic History, WP 07-01, 2007), available at
http://emiab.berkeley.edulusers/webfac/eichengreen/e2 l0aspO6/floreslending-booms.pdf.
14. JOHN H. WOOD, A HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANKING IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
277 (2005).
15. See Mike Peacock, Crisis Has Legs Despite Central Bank Endeavour,REUTERS UK, Dec. 13, 2007,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL 1339203520071213.
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B. U.S. FederalReserve
The Federal Reserve system has a notable history and has been highly
influential both domestically and internationally. The United States was one of
the last advanced nations to establish a central bank, due to the political
opposition of interest groups within the industrial and agricultural sectors. Such
opposition was responsible for the closures of Alexander Hamilton's First Bank
of the United States in 1811, and the Second Bank of the United States, closed by
Andrew Jackson in 1836.16 The closure of the nation's first two central banks due
to political in-fighting had a significant and widespread effect on the U.S.
economy. In spite of the enactment of the National Banking Act in 1863, which
established a system of nationwide banks, there was ongoing instability within
the financial sector due to currency and liquidity limitations. These factors gave
rise to repeated banking crises which had increasingly damaging consequences
throughout the economy. In 1873 and 1893, for example, national banks failed
due to scarce liquidity and repeated consumer deposit runs. The Panic of 1907,
however, had long-term implications in that it initiated widespread banking
reforms.
The Panic of 1907 occurred as the New York Stock Exchange fell by
extraordinary levels during a deeply entrenched recession. Combining failed
attempts to corner the copper market coupled with recurring bank runs and an
abrupt retraction in credit and liquidity, and without a national lender of last
resort, panic spread quickly from the streets of downtown New York across the
nation." It is worthwhile noting however, that excessive speculation, brokerage
firm failures, and bank runs were not the initial triggers to the panic: "[T]the
shock that set in motion the events to create the Panic was the earthquake in San
Francisco in 1906. The devastation of that city drew gold out of the world's
major money centers. This created a liquidity crunch that created a recession
starting in June of 1907."'9
The long-term effect of the Panic of 1907 was not limited to the event itself,
but more so to the response. The reaction of industrialists such as J. Pierpont
Morgan ultimately led to the legislative action that created the Federal Reserve
System. Wall Street's preeminent banking power who was responsible for saving
the U.S. Treasury in the 1893 panic, Morgan was instrumental in gathering

16. For an interesting and illustrative history, see generally ROGER T. JOHNSON, HISTORICAL
BEGINNINGS.. .THE FEDERAL RESERVE (Mary Jane Coyle ed., 1999), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/
about/pubs/begin.pdf. For a legal and political economic analysis, see MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS,
wEAK OWNERS (1996).
17. For a detailed discussion of the Panic of 1907, see ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC
OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MARKET'S PERFECT STORM (2007).
18. Id. at 37-41, 151-171; CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL CRISES 94-96 (4th ed. 2000).
19. Abigail Tucker, The FinancialPanic of 1907: Running from History, SMITHSONIAN.COM, Oct. 10,
2008, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/1907_Panic.html.
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support from other economic elites such as John D. Rockefeller, George B.
Cortelyou, and James Stillman in order to sustain the banking system. Morgan
was equally responsible for providing liquidity to the New York Stock Exchange
over several days of tenuous trading.
The third attempt to establish a U.S. central bank came about due to concerns
over concentrations of power. While Morgan was instrumental in saving the
banking system and preventing Wall Street from collapsing, considerable
concern developed that the federal monetary system should not be dependent or
over-influenced by any individual, corporation or closed community. Created by
the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, the National Monetary Commission conducted
investigations in 1908 into the causes of the panic and additionally focused on
banking and currency reform. The Committee also examined the influence of the
"money trust" (funds provided by financiers such as Morgan and close
associates), and the intertwining relationships of their business holdings.
Congress debated the Committee's findings for almost two years, culminating in
the Federal Reserve Act enacted by President Woodrow Wilson on December 22,
1913.21

The Federal Reserve System consists of seven Board Members appointed by
the U.S. President and twelve Reserve Banks located throughout the country. The
Federal Open Market Committee is the decision-making entity of the Federal
Reserve System, overseeing open market activities and functioning through the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York:
A major component of the System is the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), which is made up of the members of the Board of
Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and
presidents of four other Federal Reserve Banks, who serve on a rotating
basis. The FOMC oversees open market operations, which is the main
tool used by the Federal Reserve to influence overall monetary and credit
conditions.22
While neoclassical opinion views the formation of the Federal Reserve as a
domestic instrument designed to stabilize a fragmented banking system, much of
the language of the 1913 Act was oriented towards empowering the new Reserve
Banks with the ability to conduct international operations, and to lead the U.S.
dollar towards becoming an international reserve currency in global trade:
"Internationally the goals were to facilitate the development of the dollar as an
international currency (whose value would be subject to central policy on the
20. See RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF
MODERN FINANCE 121-30 (2001).
21. ELMUS WICKER, THE GREAT DEBATE ON BANKING REFORM: NELSON ALDRICH AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE FED 1-8 (2005)
22. PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 3 (9th ed.2005).

8

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 23
margins) in conjunction with the foreign expansion of American joint-stock

banks." 23
The goals of central banks throughout the world differ according to their
given authority. The objectives of the Federal Reserve are outlined in its statutory
language. The Federal Reserve's Board of Governors works to promote
maximum employment and stable prices, with a focus on moderate long-term
interest rates. As the Federal Reserve has grown, so its mandate has encompassed
economic goals for monetary policy that are broader than many other models,
including those of the ECB and BOE. This has not been free from criticism.
Bofinger points out that while the Federal Reserve System has not conducted
monetary policy on an ad-hoc basis, it has pursued an "eclectic approach" which
has not always presented a well defined policy framework. 4
The still young Federal Reserve Bank was tested during the 1929 market
crash and the Great Depression of the 1930s:
From 1930 to 1993 nearly 10,000 banks failed .. . Many people blamed
the Fed for failing to stem speculative lending that led to the crash, and
some also argued that inadequate understanding of monetary economics
kept the Fed from pursuing polices that could have lessened the depth of
the Depression.25
Subsequent legislation, such as the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (repealed in
1980 and 1999), and the Banking Act of 1935, instituted changes to the Fed's
structure. The Korean conflict saw the beginnings of a more independent central
bank in terms of the use of monetary policy tools. After a period in the 1970s
when policy became discredited by volatile currency markets and alarming
inflation rates, the Federal Reserve appeared to restore stability and confidence,
and by the 1990s was seen as generally effective in using monetary policy to
combat a number of domestic financial crises. Given its record of technical
innovation, and sizeable and highly competent resources, the Federal Reserve has
become the world's most influential central bank. Its policy decisions are closely
watched and emulated by other central banks and subjected to the most critical
evaluations.
The recent financial crisis was more global in scope and far more complex
than any of its antecedents, although many aspects resemble past dislocations.
The Federal Reserve moved quickly and aggressively to restore confidence,
utilizing tools and resources that were not available in the past. While the Federal

23. J. LAWRENCE BROZ, THE INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 50 (1997).
24. PETER BOFINGER, MONETARY POLICY: GOALS, INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIES, AND INSTRUMENTS
307-08 (2001).
25. Federal Reserve Education, History of the Federal Reserve, http://www.federalreserveeducation.
org/FEDl01_HTML/History/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 6, 2010). For the most significant discussions, see
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (2009); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 (1971).
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Reserve has taken a leading role in combating the crisis, it is ineffective acting
alone. Thus, the coordinated efforts of several leading central banks are vital to
stabilizing global markets and reestablishing confidence.
C. European CentralBank
The European Central Bank (ECB) was established as the result of an
unprecedented period of political and economic integration, which, in itself, is
rich in history. The move towards European economic integration after World
War II became an increasingly important objective in acquiring lasting security. 6
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Verdier have argued that most theories of integration
point to solutions of problems related to asymmetrical information and lowering
transaction costs. In the case of the European Union however, they argue that the
move towards integration was to prevent the rise of any one regional hegemony,
and permanently to eliminate conflicts between states of unequal power and
influence.27
The trend towards integration gave rise to a series of treaties among certain
European states (the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty, the European
Coal and Steel Community Treaty, and the Treaty of Rome to create a European
Economic Community). In 1967 these treaty bodies became known as the
European Communities. At the end of the 1960s, financial and monetary
integration were first endorsed, with impetus from the collapse of the Bretton
Woods fixed exchange rate system in 1971-73. Discussions of cooperation for
European exchange rate stability were formalized into commitments for a single
currency in the 1980s and 1990s.2 ' The Single European Act in 1987 and the
Maastricht Treaty in 1993 were significant in achieving economic and monetary
integration.29 Despite a collapse in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in
1992-93, the European Monetary Institute (EMI), the predecessor to the ECB,
was established to oversee the introduction of the single European currency along
with providing the foundation for the future ECB under the Maastricht Treaty.
The ECB, inaugurated in 1998 pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty, assumed its
major mandate when the euro was introduced as an accounting currency on
January 1, 1999, during the third stage of economic and monetary union.30
Today, "[t]he ECB is the central bank for Europe's single currency, the euro.
The ECB's main task is to maintain the euro's purchasing power and thus price
26. For detailed discussion, see BARRY EICHENGREEN, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY SINCE 1945 (2006).
27. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Daniel Verdier, European Integration as a Solution to War, 11 EUR.
J. INT'L REL. 99,99-100 (2005).
28. See Mads Andenas, Douglas Amer & Mei-wah Leung, The Future of the European Single Market
for FinancialServices (Asian Inst. of Int'l Fin. L., Working Paper No. 8, 2010).
29. See Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, European Union, The European Union: A
Guide for Americans 3 (2009), http://eurunion.org/eu/images/PDF/euguide2009.pdf.
30. European Central Bank, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), http://www.ecb.intlecb/history/
emulhtml/index.en.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
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stability in the euro area. The euro area comprises the 16 European Union
countries that have introduced the euro since 1999."" Modeled largely on the
German central bank, the Bundesbank, the ECB's purchasing power and price
stability objectives effectively make inflation targeting the core objective of
monetary policy, although it is not explicitly stated as such. The ECB utilizes a
strategy that emphasizes the pursuit of an announced numerical inflation target
characterized by "a high degree of transparency and accountability."32 The
transparency of the ECB is, however, an uncertain issue that contrasts with
inflation targeting models elsewhere. There have been calls for the ECB to move
towards the more commonly used flexible inflation targeting model rather than
the more rigid model employed by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which
pioneered explicit inflation targeting in the 1980s." In terms of targeting, the
ECB's objective is a Eurozone inflation rate of approximately 2% over the
medium-term. In fact, it is the sole primary objective to which other
considerations are subordinate. This contrasts to the twin mandate of the Federal
Reserve, which is required to pursue both price stability and full employment.
While price stability is the ECB's central objective, it also issues banknotes,
monitors foreign reserves, and implements monetary policy for the Euro System.
That System is comprised of the ECB itself and the National Central Banks
(NCBs) of those E.U. states that have adopted the euro as their official currency.
While the implementation of monetary policy falls within the scope of the ECB,
policy formation is derived externally. Monetary policy decisions within the Euro
System are determined by a Governing Council rather than the ECB. This
consists of six members of the Executive Board of the ECB in addition to eleven
NCB governors . Thus, the ECB is analogous to the status of regional reserve
banks in the Federal Reserve System. The ECB is not omnipotent, as it relies
heavily on interactions with other organizations to advance its policy goals.
Howarth and Loedel compare the ECB to the analysis of government and societal
structure described in Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, likening the ECB to "a
supreme ruler that is nonetheless greatly restrained in its actions by natural law
and constitutional structure."34
While the ECB continues to build monetary policy credibility, there are
questions as to the Eurozone's fiscal authority and whether it is sufficiently

31. European Central Bank, The European Central Bank, http://www.ecb.intlecb/html/index.en.html
(last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
32. Lars E.O. Svensson, Inflation Targeting, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS ONLINE
(Steven Durlauf & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2d ed. 2008), http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=
pde2008_j000095.
33. See GUILLERMO DE LA DEHESA, SHOULD THE ECB ADOPT A FLEXIBLE INFLATION TARGETING?
(European Parliament, Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, Briefing Paper for the Monetary Dialogue
of March 2008), available at http://www.europarl.europa.euldocument/activities/cont/200803/20080312ATT2
3990/20080312ATT23990EN.pdf.
34. DAVID HOWARTH & PETER LOEDEL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: THE NEW EUROPEAN
LEVIATHAN? 177 (2003).
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developed to support the ECB. There are no clear legal outlines, and
presumptions are more the norm rather than mere guidance provided by black
letter law. While the national fiscal authorities of each member state stand by
their own national bank, there is no specified authority that fiscally stands behind
and would provide capital for the ECB if needed. Nonetheless, as overseer to the
economic stability of the eurozone, the ECB has become influential both within
and outside the European Union. In joining with other central banks from the
leading industrialized nations, the ECB is now vital to coordinated efforts in
meeting the challenges of the global financial crisis.
D. Summary
The major central banks have rich and colorful histories, providing
interesting reflections of not only the banks themselves but of the socio-political
climate that existed during their respective developments. The establishment of a
central bank has become an integral part in both industrialized and developing
nations. Although the debates will continue regarding the role central banks
should be assigned, they are arguably instrumental in ensuring financial stability.
By striving to maintain stability, affecting exchange rates, and shaping monetary
policy, central banks are able to facilitate broad international cooperation.
Central banks have grown and solidified their positions by taking increasing
responsibilities for safeguarding national economies. They have, in turn, strived
to separate themselves from political influence by functioning as independent
entities. This independence most exemplifies the rise of the modern central bank.
It is this aspect of the development of central banking to which we now turn.
Ill. CENTRAL BANKS AND CENTRAL BANKING

Central banks play the primary role in shaping monetary policy and
maintaining financial stability in economies around the world. Although
designated as "banks," central banks do not customarily take deposits or lend
money as the commercial sector is understood to do. A central bank, as the name
indicates, stands at the core of the financial system. It is an agency responsible
for issuance of currency, operation of monetary policy (including open market
operations), and engagement in activities designed to facilitate healthy business
interactions (e.g., serving as an intermediary between banks and as the state's
principal bank). The central bank can be a government agency (in most cases) or
a privately owned institution (now rare), or a mixture of the two. However,
regardless of the ownership structure, the central bank is a state or quasigovernmental organization. As such, its goals may include a broad set of
objectives such as maintaining the value of currency, supporting financial
stability, and promoting employment and economic growth in the economy.
Although the responsibilities of central banks vary, each is clearly at the center of
the financial system it oversees.
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A. CentralBank Functions
At the heart of modern central banking are two objectives: monetary stability
and financial stability, often supplemented by economic and/or financial
development."
1. Monetary Stability
One of the most important duties of the central bank is to conduct monetary
policy in the pursuit of monetary stability, which is customarily seen as a
relatively low nominal rate of price inflation. A central bank achieves this goal
by influencing the money aggregates, in some cases with specific interest rate or
exchange rate objectives, and in others by setting targets for monetary base
expansion. Whereas in the 1980s central bank practice focused on money supply
control as a proxy for inflation targeting, the majority of leading central banks
have since the 1990s adopted an approach that regards interest rates or exchange
rates as instruments that influence the outcome of monetary growth and price
inflation, with objectives set across a range of monetary variables and economic
expectations.36 This pragmatism reflects the influential thinking of Charles
Goodhart, formerly of the BOE, that explicit target setting in monetary policy
causes a breakdown in the statistical relationship between the available policy
instrument and the target variable.
Most central banks are given primary responsibility for preserving the value
of the currency, making price stability the core goal of the majority. The key
consideration underscoring the importance of inflation control is that high,
unstable inflation will adversely affect socio-economic conditions. First, high
inflation will steadily erode real incomes thus causing reduced living standards.
Second, unstable inflation will create uncertainty for investors, commercial
organizations and government agencies in planning and decision making.
Empirical evidence suggests that unstable inflation will increase the difficulties
for people in making decisions as to consumption, investment and production,
which will ultimately reduce general economic growth. Third, a higher rate of
domestic inflation compared to inflation in neighboring countries will cause real
domestic interest rates to lose competitiveness, and put downward pressure on
the domestic currency.

35. For detailed discussion, see ROSA LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING REGULATION (1996);
DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF LAW (2007).
36. A survey of monetary policy approaches appears in 67th Annual Report, 1996-1997 BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS 140-60, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ar67f01.pdf.
37. See C.A.E. GOODHART, MONEY, INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY (2d ed. 1989).
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2.

FinancialStability

A second key function of any central bank is to support financial stability.
The central bank is important in ensuring the safety and integrity of the financial
system (especially the banking system). This it can do in a number of ways,
including macroeconomic surveillance, prudential regulation and supervision, as
well as serving as lender of last resort. Additionally, central banks are often
responsible for the smooth functioning of the government securities markets and
money transmission systems.
While banking supervision is typically thought to be a common activity of a
central bank, this is often not the case. The BOE for example, had its banking
supervisory powers passed to the Financial Services Authority in 1998;" the U.S.
Federal Reserve, at present, only regulates bank holding companies, while
regulation of national banks is the responsibility of the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC), and regulation of members of the deposit insurance
system is separately regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).
In relation to lender of last resort function, if bank depositors seek to
withdraw their deposits for whatever reason, the bank will use reserves of cash
and marketable securities to meet the resulting demand. With reserves depleted,
the bank must reduce its balance sheet assets by recalling loans, and use
incoming receipts to replenish its reserves. However, the contractual conditions
of loans mean that this may take some time, while deposit withdrawal may be
rapid. The central bank stands ready to inject emergency liquidity in such cases,
by lending to the bank to the fullest extent that it can provide acceptable
collateral to secure. This function can replenish bank reserves quickly and
prevent a systemic loss of confidence. When the crisis eases, the bank provided
with lender of last resort assistance will repay the loans and return to an adequate
reserve level, usually with a smaller balance sheet. Clearly such a mechanism
serves to protect against banking sector panic.
In this context, as seen in the case of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it
is often difficult to evaluate a troubled entity to determine if intervention is an
appropriate option 9 Allen and Gale point to the many commentators who
questioned the necessity of the Federal Reserve's 1998 intervention in facilitating
a takeover of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM).4 Central
bank legislation often minimizes the lender of last resort language: "This is
probably out of deference to the fear of many central bankers that moral hazard

38. STEPHEN VALDEZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 55 (5th ed. 2007).
39. Martin Hutchinson, The Wrong Rescues, AsiA TIMES ONLINE, Sep. 24, 2008, http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/GlobalEconomy/J124Dj02.html; Chris Isidore, Why they let Lehman Die, CNNMONEY, Sep. 15,
2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/15/news/companies/why-bearnot_1ehman/index.htm.
40.

FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, LIQuIDITY, ASSET PRICES

AND SYSTEMIC RISK, availableat http://www.bis.org/cgfs/conf/mar02a.pdf.

14

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 23
would be encouraged even by merely officially recognising the rights and duties
of the central bank and the private banks in situations of systemic financial
instability."4 1 Concerns over the moral hazard presented by the presence of a
lender of last resort are in no sense new. Walter Bagehot addressed the issue in
his 1873 work, Lombard St: "If the banks are bad, they will certainly continue
bad and will probably become worse if the government sustains and encourages
them. The cardinal maxim, is that any aid to a present bad bank is the surest
mode of preventing the establishment of a future good bank."42
3. Banker's Bank
Finally, the central bank also serves as the banker's bank. First, the central
bank holds other banks' reserves. Second, the central bank makes loans to other
banks as a means of influencing liquidity and short-term interest rates. Third,
central banks are generally responsible for overseeing national payment systems
and often act as their central operator. The central bank also plays a role as the
government's bank, providing currency and savings services. Finally, the central
bank often issues currency and may issue and deal in government securities on
behalf of the state.
B. Power, Influence, and CentralBanking in the Modern Era
The formation of key institutions, such as the BOE, the Federal Reserve, and
the ECB, has played not only critical roles in maintaining financial stability
within their respective domestic arenas, but has also acted as a catalyst in setting
practice within an increasingly globalized financial system. In analyzing central
banks in developing countries, Maxfield asserts that the costs associated with
poor monetary practices by central banks are amplified by globalization and
financial integration, thus requiring a more sophisticated and internationally
aware conduct of monetary policy. 43 While globalization continues to be a
frequently heard mantra, it is not at all new and has been present throughout
history. The force of globalization in a very real sense spurred the development
of central banks, the subject of this section.
The rise in power and influence of central banks in the modern era may be
attributed, in part, to a question of mistrust of politicians and the political
process. With increasingly volatile markets and, at times, extended periods of
high inflation, there is a widely held view that politicians are unable to
satisfactorily negotiate monetary policy, their actions more orientated toward

41. WILLEM BUITER, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, CAN CENTRAL BANKS Go BROKE? (2008),
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/policyinsights/PolicyInsight24.pdf.
42. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 100-01 (1920).
43. MAXFIELD, supra note 5, at 9.
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perpetuating and solidifying their political power and influence rather than
addressing real economic concerns.
There is a perception that continued inflationary concerns are largely unmet
when the political process is the controlling factor: "Politicians were not
sufficiently credible to be able to reduce the level of inflation.

..

. They sacrificed

the need to keep to medium-term inflationary targets in order to boost their short
term electoral needs."" Goodhart has stated that competing information from
opposing politicians (claiming their monetary policy proposals to be superior to
those of their opponents) is likely to be self-deceptive, leaving the electorate
confused. Goodhart has also asserted, however, that central banks counter this
situation by providing a more credible direction which is not swayed by an
interest to remain politically viable.45
Traditionally, the perception has been that monetary policy's primary tool for
meeting economic objectives is the application of qualitative or quantitative
control over monetary growth. In recent decades central banks, responding to
inadequacies within the political process as cited above, have moved away from
that model, orientating themselves toward short-term interest rate movements.46
With that has come the need for increased independence as central banks expand
their capabilities to meet complex challenges that are global in nature. The
multiple objectives employed by many central banks (such as the Federal
Reserve) have also contributed to a need for independence. It is that
independence which most typifies the rise of modern central banks.
1. CentralBank Independence
In recent years, many states have enacted legislation solidifying central bank
operational independence, thus removing them from many aspects of government
control and influence: "Countries ranging from Eritrea to Malta, France,
Kazakhstan, New Zealand, England, and Chile have recently approved, or
contemplated, new central bank legislation. Between 1990 and 1995 at least
thirty countries, spanning five continents, legislated increases in the statutory
independence of their central banks."47 Yet, few aspects of central banking
prompt as much disagreement as the nature of independence. Although
controversial, the subject of central bank independence serves as a primary
example of the rise in power and influence modern central banks now exert. It
can be argued that independence has allowed central banks the flexibility to
utilize increasingly creative tools in combating the highly complex global
financial crisis.

44.

ROBERT ELGIE & HELEN THOMPSON, THE POLITICs OF CENTRAL BANKS 18-19 (1998).

45.

C.A.E.

GOODHART, THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM

67-68 (1995).

46. Todd Keister, Antoine Martin & James McAndrews, Divorcing Money From Monetary Policy,
FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV. 41 (2008).
47.
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The question of independence may be as old as banking itself, but the topic
has taken on increased importance in the modem era, with Bade and Parkin
among the first to fully articulate an index based in legal and institutional
attributes.48 In essence, the appreciation for the study of central banking
independence is related to the search for effective monetary policies in the face
of increased globalization and interdependent markets, or as B.W. Fraser terms it,
a search for a new anchor: "it is a recognition that the anchors which held prices
stable in earlier eras-first the gold standard, then the Bretton Woods systemhad come adrift and something else had to be put in their place." 49
It is accepted that to constrain inflation expectations or deflationary pressures
and maintain monetary stability, a central bank must maintain independence. The
case for central bank independence is well known. Delegating monetary policy to
an agent (e.g., the central bank), whose preferences are more inflation-averse
than society's at large serves as a commitment device that permits sustaining a
lower rate of inflation than would otherwise be possible."o As economist and
central bank governor Stanley Fischer puts it:
They are arguments from the world of the second best. In a first-best world,
monetary and fiscal policy would be perfectly coordinated and chosen, and there
would be no need for an independent central bank. But in the imperfect world in
which most central bankers ply their trade, political systems tend to behave
myopically, favoring inflationary policies with short-run benefits and discounting
excessively their long-run costs. An independent central bank, given
responsibility for price stability, can overcome this inflationary bias.'
Indeed, insulating monetary policy from the political process avoids the
aforementioned problems and helps enforce a low inflation equilibrium. The
empirical evidence that, on average, countries with more independent central
banks have lower inflation, at no cost in terms of growth or the variability of
growth, is pervasive. A country is more likely to have low inflation if its central
bank is more independent. For example, in 1993 Alesina and Summers reported a
significant negative correlation between the index of central bank independence
and average inflation rate. They also identified a negative correlation between
central bank independence and variance of the inflation rate-a measure of the
stability of macroeconomic policies.52
While the overriding thought is that the concept of independence relates to a
separation of central banking decisions from the political process, there is no
48. ROBIN BADE & MICHAEL PARKIN, UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO, DEP'T OF ECON., CENTRAL
BANK LAWS AND MONETARY POLICY (1988).
49. B.W. Fraser, Central Bank Independence: What Does it Mean?, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA
BULLETIN, Dec. 1994, available at http://www.rba.gov.aulpublications/bulletin/1994/dec/pdf/bu-1294-1.pdf
50. Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H Summers, Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic
Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 151, 151-52 (1993).
51. Stanley Fischer, Maintaining Price Stability, THE REGION, June 1997, http://www.rninneapolisfed.
org/publications-papers/pub display.cfm?id=3637.
52. Alesina & Summers, supra note 50.
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agreement upon the indicators that define independence." By necessity, there will
always be a connection between central banks and governments. The question, in
reality, is what degree of independence is practical. No clear consensus is yet to
prevail. Elgie and Thompson, for example, state that political independence and
economic independence are the indicators of central bank independence:
"'Political independence' may be defined as the central bank's ability to make
policy decisions without interference from the core executive," [while] economic
independence may be defined as the central bank's ability to use the full range of
monetary policy instruments without restrictions from the core executive."
In an earlier period when few central banks were formally independent but
aspects
of financial and monetary policy were far less closely observed and
all
reported than today, transnational credit arrangements were typically negotiated
with a high degree of secrecy that excluded legislators and members of
government. For example, a line of credit of US$3.0 billion in favor of the BOE
was negotiated in 1964 by a eleven central banks and others through the Bank for
International Settlement (BIS) and with the Federal Reserve as the effective
leader." These discussions were withheld from cabinet discussion in London by
an inner group of ministers, and presented by the then prime minister in a wholly
different light to prefatory FOMC discussions as the work and indefatigability of
the British government.
Cukierman, Web, and Neyapti, in attempting to measure independence,
concluded four primary components: how appointments are made; the use of
policy targets; third party conflict resolution between a central bank and the
executive branch; and rules limiting funding to the government. 7 Considering the
degree of independence, Buiter stated that the ECB is the most independent
central bank due to its ability to set operational objectives and the self-governing
nature of its goals." Bofinger, while factoring in personal independence (the
removal of the threat of dismissal of the central bank governor by the finance
minister or head of government), concurs with Buiter by stating that in
accordance to those indicators, "the ECB is currently the most independent
central bank in the world.""
53. For example, Parkin developed a sixteen-cell construct which distinguished between various types of
central bank independence. See Michael Parkin, Domestic Monetary Institutions and Deficits in DEFICITs 310337 (J.M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1987).
54. ELGIE & THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 18.
55. 35th Annual Report, 1964-1965 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS 122. For a narrative of a Federal
Reserve Bank of New York officially responsible for central bank negotiations in 1961-1975, see CHARLES A.
COOMBS, THE ARENA OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (1976).
56. See 1 RICHARD CROSSMAN, THE DIARIES OF A CABINET MINISTER:, MINISTER OF HOUSING 1964-66,
at 57, 71 (1975) (briefly discussing the secretive negotiations that lead to the deal).
57. Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb & Bilin Neyapti, Measuring the Independence of Central Banks
and its Effect on Policy Outcomes, 6 WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REV. 353 (1992).
58. WILLEM H. BUITER, RErHINKING INFLATION TARGETING AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 21
(2006).
59. BOFINGER, supra note 24, at 205.
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While the pursuit of independence may be the objective of many central
banks, Buiter argues that by function, central banking independence leads to less
substantive accountability, with the citizenry forced to accept only formalized
accountability. He defines formal accountability as: "the aspect of responsibility
involving giving, ex-post, a statistical or judicial explanation for events, actions
and outcomes."a Substantive accountability means that, following such
reporting, explanation and justification, judgment (or other pleasant or unpleasant
consequences), may follow.
Extending that argument, it could be posited that central banks, in executing
legitimate independence are by necessity substantively unaccountable if they
function without fear of reprisal or sanction (save for incapacity or willful
misconduct).
The legitimacy or justification of central bank independence may be weighed
against its effectiveness in providing stable financial markets and supporting
economic activity. Despite a significant amount of legislation to support
independence throughout the world, the impact is debatable and the empirical
evidence remains decidedly mixed. Maxfield elaborates: "While evidence
suggests that central bank independence is associated with low inflation, at least
in highly industrialized economies, there is less corroboration of a hypothesized
connection between central bank independence and overall economic health."
Anecdotal support for this assertion can be seen from the decade of deflationary
conditions in Japan, notwithstanding the independent standing of the Bank of
Japan, and its mandate to promote favorable economic conditions.
Grilli et al found that independence (political and economic) was negatively
correlated to the inflation rate level, and found no significant correlation to the
overall growth rate in real GNP.6 However, it should be pointed out that this, in
itself, is not evidence of causality. Pollard, in accessing a number of studies, has
concluded that the mixed results may lie with the varying definitions of
independence; further, there could be significant ideological differences and
objectives between a central bank and the executive branch which adversely
influence their relationship: "Theoretical studies indicate that an independent
central bank can increase policy conflicts with the government whenever the
preferences of the two differ and, in so doing, worsen the economic performance
,,61
of a country.

60. BUfTER, supra note 58, at 22.
61. MAXFIELD, supranote 5, at 13.
62. Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro & Guido Tabellini, Political and Monetary Institutions and
Public FinancialPolicies in the Industrial Countries,6 ECON. POL'Y 342, 374 (1991).
63. Patricia S. Pollard, Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF ST. Louis REVIEW, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 21, 35, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/
review/93/07/Bank_JulAug 1993.pdf.
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2. Independence Under Attack: A Precedentfor the Future?
In spite of the fact that an independent central bank has not definitively been
quantitatively proven to positively shape economic growth in real terms, they
nonetheless continue to flourish and are viewed as essential in a developed
economy. A further inquiry explores the apparent contradiction in the
relationship between the government and a central bank by questioning why a
government would cede authority over monetary policy to an entity that is
(hypothetically) independent of its influence, and which may act contrary to its
desires.
Goodman addresses this question and posits three primary reasons. First, he
notes the government's ability to reap the political rewards of central bank
independence (and any positive aspects of performance), which is then translated
into an increase in electoral support. Second, he argues that social coalitions,
which reflect policy preferences, dictate economic choices. The third reason is
the overall positive impression of central banks expressed by global leaders. All
three factors contribute to the desire of a government to grant monetary policy
independence to its central bank.
It can be argued, however, that in the face of difficult fiscal and monetary
environments, such as the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the
commitment to central bank independence breaks down. The recent removal of
Iceland's central bank governor, David Oddsson during the global financial
crisis, for example, may have signaled the beginning of a trend towards attacks
65
upon central bank independence.
While independence may be the rallying call among central banks, its
sustainability may come under fire as banks trespass into politically sensitive
areas. As "more uncertain questions open up, politicians will be tempted to break
central bank independence and take back decision-making."6 Most recently, this
has been seen in the United States with a range of calls to limit the independence
of the Federal Reserve. At the same time, there has been no similar trend in
Europe. Additionally, in Asia and elsewhere outside the Western developed
economies, central bank independence in operations and governance has been
seldom granted, and appears to be less valued than the state's capacity to
influence domestic or external monetary policy. It is likely that increasing
attention will focus in future on these closely connected political and economic
structures, as expressed, for example, in China's central bank, the People's Bank
of China (PBOC).
64. JOHN B. GOODMAN, MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY: THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN WESTERN
EUROPE 7-8 (1992).
65. Mary Stokes, Iceland's Rollback of Central Bank Independence: Sign of Things to Come
Elsewhere?, RGE EUR. ECONOMONITOR, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.rgemonitor.comleuro-monitor/256339/
icelands rollback of central-bank-independence-sign-ofthingsjtocomeelsewhere.
66. Guido Tabellini, Why Central Banking is No Longer Boring, VOX, June 23, 2008, http://voxeu.
org/index.php?q=node/1259.
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C. Summary
The debate concerning the sustainability of the independence of central
banks in the wake of a complex financial crisis is a discord that is in the early
stages. Nonetheless, today's central banks are using their self-governing
authority to navigate through the difficulties of a financial crisis unprecedented
since the Great Depression. While central banks adhere to domestic concerns and
act autonomously, their independence allows the growth of international
cooperation that is increasingly vital to support a state's economic viability. It is
with the global crisis in mind that this Article moves forward to investigate the
anatomy of a crisis and the resulting international cooperative efforts.
IV. CRISIS AND DOMESTIC CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION
Central banks play a critical role in maintaining the financial strength and
viability of domestic and global financial markets. Schinasi argues that when
central banks ensure the proper functioning of payment systems and influence the
real economy by using monetary policy, they are, in essence, playing their
natural role of ensuring financial stability.6 ' Thus, their importance during
economically challenging environments is, by necessity, more pronounced. In the
aftermath of the September 11', 2001 terrorist attacks, for example, the Federal
Reserve moved quickly to assure the markets by issuing a short statement: "The
Federal Reserve System is open and operating. The Discount Window is
available to meet liquidity needs." While modest in verbiage, the statement was
significant and ensured the continuing operation of banks by providing any
69
marginal liquidity needed to help banks meet unforeseen payment requirements.
The global financial crisis, however, has not been responsive to short
statements, nor has the crisis been confined to a single sector. Rather, it has had
far reaching implications and has required central banks to use increasingly
creative measures to help prevent a general collapse of credit markets in a
fashion not seen since the 1930s. This article briefly dissects the crisis before
moving towards central bank responses.
A. Anatomy of a Crisis
For the first time since the 1930s, the United States experienced in 2008 a
systemic financial crisis. On September 18, 2008, the financial system came
close to collapse and most global credit markets ceased to function for the
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ensuing four weeks. The ultimate economic impact of this financial crisis-the
subprime crisis of 2007 originating in the United States, which evolved
contagiously into a global financial crisis in 2008 to 2009-is not yet known. Yet
following a series of dramatic events, including the failure of major financial
institutions and significant government interventions in the financial system, it is
clear that the U.S. and global financial systems will not collapse and that an
economic depression of the sort unseen since the 1930s will not take place.
Nonetheless, the financial crisis has resulted in the most severe recession in the
United States and in the global economy since the 1930s.
Systemic risk is defined as:
[T]he risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or
confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial
portion of the financial system that is serious enough to quite probably
have significant adverse effects on the real economy. Systemic risk
events can be sudden and unexpected, or the likelihood of their
occurrence can build up through time in the absence of appropriate
policy responses. The adverse real economic effects from systemic
problems are generally seen as arising from disruptions to the payment
system, to credit flows, and from the destruction of asset values.o
Preventing and addressing systemic risk is the essential function of central
banks in their pursuit of financial stability. While the major central banks were
not able to prevent a systemic financial crisis, their actions were vital in
preventing a systemic financial and economic collapse.
B. FederalReserve
The primary central banks at the epicenter of the crisis, the Federal Reserve,
the BOE, and the ECB, initially responded to the crisis with a domestic focus.
The U.S. domestic responses at the initial stages of the crisis were largely
dictated by moves by the U.S. Federal Reserve, often under Section 13 of the
Federal Reserve Act. The initial strategies were predominately focused on
providing liquidity to the money markets in order to bring down the cost of
interbank lending, asset purchases, and depositor and debt guarantees. These
strategies are still employed today in various ways. It can be argued that the
Fed's initial strategy was not wholly successful, as it failed to address the core
issue of inter-bank confidence: "Central banks cannot compensate for this lack of
confidence simply by injecting additional liquidity. On the contrary, the financial
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market participants themselves must take the fundamental steps needed to restore
this confidence."
The failure of Lehman Brothers, the intervention by the government into
AIG, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, along with the failure of Washington Mutual,
the largest bank failure in U.S. history, spoke to the realization of the risk of a
domestic systemic implosion. The fall of Lehman, for example, had significant,
far reaching implications: "Following Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy on 15
September, conditions in financial markets deteriorated to new lows. Liquidity
demand surged while perceived counterparty risk rose to record highs, resulting
in the virtual shutdown of the unsecured interbank lending market." 72
Further, the failures of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in the preceding month
exemplified the possibility of the financial crisis becoming an economic crisis.
As these government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are the largest issuers of U.S.
agency securities, their default would have jeopardized the U.S. government's
ability to fund itself through debt sales. While the GSEs were not explicitly
backed by the government, support was nonetheless seen by the passage of the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008..
As has been noted, the U.S. response during the early stages also included
the Federal Reserve functioning as a lender of last resort, and working to
facilitate agreements between many other entities. Working in conjunction with
the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve facilitated the acquisition of Bear Stearns
by JPMorgan Chase, for example, while also overseeing the resolution of
Wachovia Bank. Furthermore, large financial institutions such as Citigroup and
Merrill Lynch took sizeable write-offs as holders of securities that had become
impossible to value, further eroding general confidence.74 While acknowledging
that intervention can be counterproductive, Ben Bernanke of the Federal Reserve
viewed it as a matter of public policy and asserted that the intervention as lender
and facilitator of last resort in the above examples were necessary: "[I1n my
view, the failure of a major financial institution at a time when financial markets
are already quite fragile poses too great a threat to financial and economic
stability to be ignored. In such cases, intervention is necessary to protect public
interest."75
Peacock, supra note 15.
Bank for Int'l Settlements [BIS], International Banking and FinancialMarket Developments, BIS
QUARTERLY REV., Dec. 2008, at 44, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r.qt0812.pdf (internal citation
omitted).
73. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654, available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ289/content-detail.html; see generally Zachary A. Goldfarb,
David Cho & Binyamin Appelbaum, Treasury to Rescue Fannie and Freddie, WASH. PosT, Sept. 7, 2008
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/06/AR2008090602540.html?hpid
=topnews (discussing the Bush administration's plan to intervene in the private financial market after Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac could no longer fund mortgages).
74. See Michael J. de la Merced, Bankers Face Grim Truth: Worst is Yet to Come, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/12/business/12place.html.
75. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Greater
71.
72.
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The Federal Reserve response at the onset of the crisis can best be described
as ad hoc attempts intended to slow the collapse of the financial system, while
also attempting to increase short-term liquidity. With early responses being
eclectic in nature, there was early criticism that the Federal Reserve did not fully
appreciate the depth of the crisis and, thus, did not move with the proper sense of
urgency. In response to the criticisms, the Federal Reserve initiated, and then
strengthened, a series of short-term measures in hopes of stabilizing the
markets." In December of 2007 the Federal Reserve introduced Term Auction
Facility (TAF), which focused on auctioning discount credit while expanding
what they accepted as collateral.7 ' Furthering the desire to promote liquidity by
offering treasuries, the Reserve created the Term Securities Lending Facility
(TSLF)." Additionally, the Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP), Money
Market Mutual Fund (MMMF), and Liquidity Facility (AMLF) Programs were
geared toward supporting the money markets against significant redemptions by
investors, which, due to general illiquidity caused acute problems for money
market mutual funds."o Arguably the most sweeping of government actions was
the Troubled Assets Relief Plan (TARP), which, after considerable debate and
delay, was passed under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
Although TARP has been lauded as having promoted financial stability by its
82
continued injection of capital into key financial institutions, by the time it
became law in October 2008, the financial crisis had already significantly
affected the real economy. TARP was insufficient to stem the damage, and credit
and finance markets continued to be dysfunctional, above all with significant
hoarding of liquidity by risk averse lenders. Issues relating to TARP's
implementation concern the reluctance of smaller banks to accept funds due to a
presumed stigma of accepting public support and due to concomitant government
restrictions on operations. While large entities such as Goldman Sachs and

Austin Chamber of Commerce: Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis (Dec. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm.
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77. See Riccardo DiCecio & Charles S. Gascon, New Monetary Policy Tools?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
ST. Louis: MONETARY TRENDS, May 2008, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/mt/200
80501/cover.pdf.
78. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 12, 2007) (on file with author),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm.
79. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with author),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080311a.htm.
80. Federal Reserve Discount Window and Payment System Risk, Asset Backed Commercial Paper
(ABCP) Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) Liquidity Facility (AMLF or "the Facility"), http://www.
frbdiscountwindow.org/mmmf.cfm?hdrlD=14 (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) (follow "How will this program
support money market mutual funds?" link).
81. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
82. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Testimony Before the
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JPMorgan are aggressively repaying the federal funds, many smaller banks have
withdrawn their request, lessening TARP's impact." The experience with TARP
was not unique. More than $125 billion in funds offered to banks by Bank of
Japan and the Japanese Ministry of Finance was met with resistance by many of
Japan's largest banks.
In coordinating with Federal Reserve actions, the Treasury Department
began to periodically purchase preferred stock from a number of U.S. banks
under a Capital Purchase Program in an effort to generate additional liquidity.
Further, in coordinating with the Treasury's Capital Assistance Program (CAP),
which makes capital available to financial institutions as a bridge to private
capital in the future, the Federal Reserve devised a forward-looking assessment
protocol intended to weigh the financial condition of large U.S. bank holding
companies (BHCs). Under the auspices of the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program (SCAP), on May 7, 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank released the first
results of "stress tests" to estimate the resilience of the subjects to further shocks.
Of the nineteen banks tested, nine were found to be adequately capitalized, with
the others subject to various degrees of possible future capital or liquidity
shortfalls." Citigroup and Bank of America were found to need the most capital,
with Citigroup projected to require $50 billion, and Bank of America nearly $35
billion." Stress tests will undoubtedly result in higher bank capital, liquidity and
leverage requirements to enable the BHC's to withstand a prolonged recession,
and may improve transparency by providing more standardized risk-related
information. The Federal Reserve, while fully engaged in international interbank
cooperation, continues to work with various agencies of the government in
pursing strategies which can overcome the current financial crisis and reestablish
domestic stability.
C. Bank of England
The BOE increased over time the aggressiveness of its responses to the crisis,
having been criticized for earlier mishandling of troubled banks in 2007, when it
seemed to over-emphasize the moral hazard associated with lender of last resort
assistance. Mortgage lender Northern Rock, for example, suffered a severe
deposit run but was subjected to a slow BOE response, which some observers
cite as a prevailing reason for the bank's later failure and nationalization. The
83. Tom Braithwaite, Tarp Demand Hit by 'Stigma', FIN. TIMES (U.K.), May 21, 2009, at 5.
84. Lindsay Whipp, JapanBanks Urged to Seek Public Help, FIN. TIMES (UK), Mar. 23, 2009, at 2.
85. Press Release, Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., (May 7,
2009) (on file with author), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090507a.htm.
86. Francesco Guerrera & Greg Farrell, Citigroup and BofA Need Most Capital,FIN. TIMES (ASIA), May
7, 2009, at 1.
87. See Tom Bower, How Richard Branson Lost Northern Rock, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Jul. 20, 2008,
available at http:/Ibusiness.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry-sectors/banking-and-financelarticle436302
9.ece.
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Financial Service Authority (FSA)-the U.K. financial regulator-has
acknowledged shortcomings in its supervisory approach that were highlighted by
Northern Rock's collapse."8
Following its initially slow response, the BOE responded to the credit crisis
by injecting cash into troubled banks on a coordinated basis. Like the Federal
Reserve and European Central Bank, the BOE was authorized in March 2009 to
institute a £l50bn quantitative easing program to support the purchase of
securities such as government and high-grade corporate bonds. 9 While
quantitative easing has its own adverse inflationary potential, it is the
transference of risk onto the BOE's balance sheet that is becoming problematic.
Under the BOE's Special Liquidity Scheme, less liquid securities were accepted
and the term of its operations extended by accepting collateral of longer tenors.
The BIS expressed concern at increasing central bank balance sheets (in some
cases doubling), which had become burdened by the acquisition of large
quantities of toxic securities for which no market value could be ascertained. 0
The impact of this burden was seen when in May 2009, Standard & Poor's
altered its outlook for Britain's AAA/Aaa sovereign credit rating." Although
Spain, Ireland, and Greece have seen their credit ratings lowered, 92 the United
Kingdom was the first major economy to be threatened with a downgrade, and
while it carries a lower degree of gross debt as a percent of GDP than other
Group of 7 nations, its exposure to risk is clear, either through higher debt service
costs or from a reduced demand for future debt issues. The UK is not alone
however, among leading nations being cited for increasing debt burden and
potentially precarious financial standing. Moody's Investor Services has warned
that the U.S. risks its Aaa credit rating if it fails to experience an economic
upturn and initiate more definitive action to arrest a soaring budget deficit. 3 The
BOE, however, continues to use a combination of monetary strategies to address
domestic instability in support of its overall objective of inflation targeting,
which will ultimately present significant challenges in the medium and longterm.
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D. European CentralBank
It is often taken that the ECB modeled its financial crisis response on Federal
Reserve actions. That assessment would fail in that it does not reflect the depth of
ECB policy strategies, which are unique to its environment. Specifically, this
characterization ignores fundamental differences between the economic
structures of the United States and the European Union and which of necessity
require different responses. While the United States has a market-based financial
system, the E.U. financial system is predominately bank-centered. Thus the
ECB's primary crisis response focuses on ensuring the stability of the banking
sector and the continued access to bank credit by consumers. Small and medium
sized enterprises (SMEs) in the E.U. traditionally have no material reliance on
market-based funding, thereby emphasizing the ECB's commitment to stabilizing
banks, which are a primary funding source for SMEs and other enterprises.
The onset of the crisis saw ECB strategy focus on the traditional tool of
short-term interest rate cuts so as to stimulate liquidity. While the ECB continues
to maintain low interest rates, this approach is incapable of ameliorating
conditions of acute illiquidity. The ECB therefore increased the aggressiveness of
its rate cuts. 94 In the early phase of the crisis in 2007, the ECB provided 95
billion ($131 billion) in loans to forty-nine financial institutions, the first central
bank to make such a sizable commitment.5 In spite of this direct infusion, the
ECB continues to use interest rates as a tool, although it has since varied its
approach. In normally conditions central bank funds are made available at short
maturities through an auction process with rates determined by successful bids.
During the crisis, the ECB set both available amounts and interest rates as well as
providing greatly extended maturity dates. By guaranteeing liquidity at
exceptionally low interest rates, the ECB sought to encourage interbank market
confidence.
As noted above, the ECB's assigned objective is price stability. While it
pursues its objective with consideration for specific inflation targets, the ECB
nonetheless employed a wide range of policies during the crisis. For example, it
applied quantitative easing to purchase securities and bank loans, aligning with
96
Federal Reserve and BOE practices. While the mechanical process equates to
quantitative easing, Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB president, insisted that the ECB
97
was "not embarking" on a quantitative easing program.
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The hallmark of the ECB's efforts during the crisis has been flexibility.
Trichet continually stated that no initiative was beyond bounds. The ECB
employed certain non-standard policy instruments in its effort to mitigate the
worst recession in Europe since World War II, with its president citing the
collapse of Lehman Brothers as justification for discarding tradition." The
resulting mindset has been a hardened resolve and willingness to consider any
option that may contribute to a eurozone recovery.
E. Summary
In this section the Article explored the domestic responses of the leading
central banks, the Federal Reserve, BOE, and ECB. While the larger objectives
of a stable domestic economy are common threads, the mechanics of how to
pursue that goal that goal are uniquely different, shaped, in part, by historical and
cultural influences. Even if the three principle central banks employ similar
monetary tools, its use within a larger array of monetary policy options will vary
from central bank to central bank.
While the sophistication of the three central banks is well documented, it has
also become quite apparent that no single state possessed the resources and
ability to stem the global downward spiral. Thus central bankers and international
organizations have strongly emphasized collaborative action. This is not a new
aspect of monetary policy, but cooperation became more urgent as the crisis of
2007-09 unfolded, which is the focus of the following section.
V. INTERNATIONAL CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION
Central bank coordination was a predominant feature in the systemic phase
of the global financial crisis. While governments in the United States and Europe
were hampered by legislative debates (forestalling much needed rescue
packages), their central banks worked in concert to prevent a global systemic
financial collapse. The need for cooperation can be seen in the many routes by
which shocks are transmitted from one country to another and there is evidence
to associate greater financial globalization with the contagion seen earlier in the
Asian regional crisis of 1997-98 as well as other emerging market crises of
confidence. Rapid losses of confidence cross borders rapidly, and can induce
permanent contractions in economic activity. Finally, the widespread need for
reserve currency liquidity adds to the importance of explicit coordinated policy
actions.
Lines made among central bank have been of three main kinds: short-term
credit lines, foreign exchange (FX) swap lines and repurchase ("repo") lines,
with the last being less common. The credit and swap lines allow short-term
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advances in a designated currency, usually US dollars as the dominant post-1945
currency of trade, or one or both of the currencies of the participants. These lines
were used on occasions prior to the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime in
1971-73, typically to bridge to medium-term credit expected from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or some collaborative plan. Swap lines have
been used more frequently, notably after currency convertibility was adopted by
industrialized economies from 1958, and acted as a liquidity device by providing
for simultaneous spot and forward FX transactions. As liquidity instruments, FX
swap lines are effectively repo lines involving amounts of currency rather than
securities. In the 1960s, the forward unwinding trade was conducted at the same
exchange rate as the opening spot trade but this practice lapsed as the fixed
exchange rate era ended and terms of line usage became negotiable. 9
Lines were informal and event-driven until the late 1950s during the first
phase of the Bretton Woods regime, after which the progressive introduction of
currency convertibility for current exchange transactions encouraged leading
central banks to establish annually renewable standing lines. This period lasted
beyond the end of the Bretton Woods and Smithsonian agreements until the late
1990s, during which many OECD central banks engaged from time-to-time in
currency intervention or acted as lenders of last resort with collaborative support.
Lines were drawn regularly in the 1960s and 1970s, but became generally
disused in the mid-1980s and increasingly regarded as an "obviously
anachronistic setup."'" Almost all central bank lines were allowed to lapse after
1999 upon the creation of the single European currency.
OECD central banks allowed almost all lines to lapse in 1999 knowing that
that third millennium technology would allow new lines to be established almost
instantly upon shocks being recognized and decisions being taken for their
creation. September 2001 became the first such event. On September 11 and 12,
the Federal Reserve sanctioned the creation of swap lines for an initial period of
30 days with the Bank of Canada, BOE and ECB in respective amounts of $10
billion, $30 billion, and $50 billion.'o' The primary purpose was to fund those
counterparties that provided secured lender of last resort facilities in US dollars
to local and foreign banks within their jurisdiction, not all such banks being
eligible to seek funds from the New York Federal Reserve for lack of collateral
in their U.S. branches or subsidiaries.
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In the 2007-09 global crisis, a relatively new use of swap lines involved
transnational funding by certain major central banks to allow counterparts to
conduct lender of last resort operations in foreign currencies, essentially to help
mitigate paralysis in the international interbank markets. This form of use had not
been widely contemplated prior to 2007, including in Asia notwithstanding its
indirect relevance to factors contributing to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. 0 2
While cooperation continues to remain an important focus as the world
recovers, there are questions how it is defined, or how its characteristics are
identified. Cooper broadly distinguishes between six types of cooperation:
exchanges of information; the need to standardize concepts to fill gaps in
information; exchanges in dialogue concerning the objectives of central bank
policies; the need to share their perceptions of the economic outlook;
standardization of shared information so that all facets can be accurately
compared; and commonly agreed actions.'o3
While Cooper correctly notes relevant aspects of cooperation, and there
continue to be numerous calls for increased coordination in the face of clear
threats to global market stability, it is often difficult moving the political rhetoric
of coordination to actual practice. This is due, in part, to the fact that domestic
legal and regulatory frameworks, along with domestic economics and politics, by
necessity, guide domestic policy. Despite clear incentives to coordinate their
actions, the Federal Reserve and the ECB, for example-contrary to press
statements-had significant difficulty moving in concert during the initial stages
of the crisis.'" As states initially focused, almost exclusively, on national interest
instead of international collaboration, the domestic focus grossly misinterpreted
systemic problems and issues related to asymmetric information. This has been
cited as a significant factor-even within Europe-of the start of the crisis, with
commentators stating that the lack of a comprehensive European-wide plan to
work with the Federal Reserve equated to an "appalling lack of international
coordination."'05 The initial collective efforts have been called disjointed,
specifically Germany's reluctance to accept that the reality of the crisis."
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Countries instead initially pursued separate domestic agendas, reducing the
effectiveness of their actions. Forni, Gerali, and Pisani later conducted
simulations using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to explain the
differing effects on monetary and fiscal policy between unilateral and
coordinated monetary policy action. The authors used the Bank of Italy as a
unilateral actor compared to the ECB. They concluded that collaborative action
increased the impact on monetary and fiscal policies by more than 30% over that
of emergency policies implemented state-by-state.'07 International monetary
officials from both developed and developing nations therefore continue to
advance the idea of cross-border coordination. It has been frequently shown that
effective policy coordination will often facilitates positive price movements in
the markets. o8
A. A History of Cooperation
As mentioned previously, after the initial stages of the crisis took effect and
the actions of individual states were found ineffective in supporting confidence,
the focus shifted to international coordination. While the media has often used
superlatives such as "unprecedented" and "remarkable" (in spite of the slow
coordinated start) to describe the level of coordination that ultimately took place,
central banking cooperation, while haphazard and episodic at times throughout
history, is not at all a new or novel concept. Pre-1914 saw regular international
central bank cooperation, most of which concerned covering gold loses. In the
1890 Baring crisis for example, the Bank of France loaned 75 million francs to
the BOE; there was also regular central bank cooperation between the Swedish
and Danish central banks.'" Pre-1914 saw, in fact, a considerable number of
examples of international central bank cooperation, often regarding measures in
support of convertibility:
A number of central banks, when faced with pressure on their reserve
position, borrowed directly from foreign commercial banks or foreign
governments. Thus, the bank of Finland negotiated foreign short-term
credits, equivalent to 10 million Finish marks, from German, British, and
Swedish bankers in 1892, and the same amounts from a Swedish bank in
1908 and again in 1913. Likewise, in 1890 the bank of England obtained
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1.5 million pounds sterling in gold by the sale of Treasury bonds in its
portfolio to the Russian Government."o
Flandreau sees the results as motivated by national interests:
[W]hat has been interpreted as cooperation was the product of the selfish
interest of central banks: they helped each other only when this provided
a direct benefit to them, instead of mutually adjusting towards some
cooperative equilibrium as hypothesized by the cooperation view."'
Inter-war cooperation was seen through a number of lending situations which
foreshadowed the forthcoming League of Nations stabilization loan packages.
But as Eichengreen has pointed out, the traditional forms of central bank
cooperation during those years were tenuous, with the Federal Reserve not
always favoring multilateral cooperation." 2 However, an example of international
cooperation emerged from a strong relationship which had developed during the
1920s between Montagu Norman of the BOE and Benjamin Strong, president of
the new Federal Reserve."'
While initially created in 1930 to administer the Young Plan at the close of
World War II, it can be stated that the concept of central banking coordination
was institutionalized through the BIS. The BIS is the world's most long-standing
international financial organization, and has as its primary mandate to act "as a
forum for discussion and cooperation among central banks and the financial
community."ll 4 Headquartered in Basel, Switzerland, the BIS today is the
international organization of central banks. In acting as a bank to central banks
and other organizations, the BIS aims to promote monetary and financial stability
by facilitating policy analysis and formation, and by being a center for monetary
research. When the BIS functions as counterparty in financial transactions its
actions help facilitate the free flow of liquidity to central banks.
The institutionalization of the concept of central banking coordination is
further seen through entities such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Financial Stability
Board (FSB), all of which facilitate communication between central banks. In
addition, the various "G"s-the most important of which are the G-7 and the
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Group of Twenty (G-20)-meet with heads of various levels of government, as
well as ministers of finance and central bank governors.
As one example, the FSB (previously the Financial Stability Forum - FSF)
was created in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis."' It was formed to
facilitate better cross-border coordination and efficiency: its primary objective
being the pursuit of market stability through increased information exchange and
increased cooperation in supervision and surveillance." 6 As the FSF was
originally established by the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors,
there have been claims that developing countries had little input or opportunity to
influence policy formation. In response, the FSB recently expanded its
membership to include the G-20 and other countries.'17 Additionally, the FSF
expanded its role to include increased oversight and regulatory powers."
As has been demonstrated, the concept of central bank cooperation is not
new, even if unpredictable and sporadic. Often tenuous and frequently faced with
nationalistic and political agendas, central bank cooperation has, nonetheless,
been present in various degrees among the advanced economies. The global
financial crisis of 2007-09 has helped redefine concepts of central banking
cooperation. National market interdependence continues to motivate policy
makers to call for increased joint efforts in the wake of the ineffectiveness of
unilateral actions. The vast resources and technical expertise of the United States
had little impact in stemming the tide during the early stages of the crisis and the
Federal Reserve at first pursued unilateral measures which had little real impact
on market behavior. The BOE has been noted for its exceptionally slow response
in intervening into troubled entities. In continental Europe, a lack of dialogue and
collaboration was clear within the ECB. Even today, ECB officials from different
countries project contradictory signals, making it difficult for global markets to
judge the ECB's true position."' The Bank of Japan, struggling with the impact
of a "lost decade" of slow growth and general deflation has experimented with
quantitative easing and a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) but failed to develop a
viable domestic response. Its ability to coordinate actions with its international
counterparts was consequently delayed. As the ineffectiveness of unilateral
domestically oriented policy initiatives became evident, central banks began
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coordinated efforts which slowly started to thaw frozen markets. It is to that
period that this Article now turns.
B. CentralBank Coordinationin the Global FinancialCrisis
"None of our countries acting alone could end this crisis."
-Nicolas Sarkozy, French President20
The coordination effort between central banks during the global financial
crisis had their roots in a November 2007 G-20 meeting held in South Africa.
Although reform of international financial institutions was a major agenda issue,
the meeting instead focused on the realization that a crisis was at hand and a joint
response was needed. After the summit closed, G-20 ministers issued a
communiqu6 stressing the presence of a slowdown in the global economy with a
duration that was difficult to predict. It stated further that market turbulence from
the preceding summer was the manifestation of a deeper problem, more
prolonged in nature than previously anticipated, and announced an agreement
between central bank governors acknowledging shared global responsibility in
rectifying the problem. Those were problems which particularly related to more
effective supervision, risk assessment, and increased transparency."' Adding to
that, the United States stated a need to focus on the evaluation of complex
derivatives while examining the role of credit rating agencies.122
In the following days a series of announcements were made intended to
telegraph the idea that monetary authorities were no longer limiting themselves
to domestic solutions: "In a simultaneous announcement to markets, the Federal
Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada
and the Swiss National Bank committed to pumping more liquidity into financial
markets and accepting wider collateral from commercial banks in return for

central bank funds."
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This first significant announcement concerning joint efforts had ramifications
on several levels: "The joint operation, by the Fed, the Bank of England, the
European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Canada, was
both an admission by them of the seriousness of the situation and an attempt to
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do something about it . . . ."124 The idea of accepting wider forms of collateral
was seen in the Federal Reserve creating the TAF, whereby funds were auctioned
off using the changed collateral requirements. Further, temporary currency
arrangements were made with a number of countries. These swap lines were
initially established with the ECB and the Swiss National Bank, providing $20
billion and $4 billion, respectively. 125 Much of the early coordinated response
dealt with increasing swap lines between the United States and other countries, as
Washington moved to keep the U.S. dollar available for foreign central banks to
lend to their banks to both meet reserve requirements and to ensure liquidly.
Bernanke, on one aspect of the benefits of swaps, stated:
Because short-term funding markets are interconnected, the provision of
dollar liquidity in major foreign markets eases conditions in dollar funding
markets globally, including here in the United States. Importantly, these swap
arrangements pose essentially no credit risk because our counterparties are the
foreign central banks themselves, which take responsibility for the extension of
dollar credit within their jurisdictions.'26
The United States subsequently increased the number of countries to which
swap arrangements are made. Swap lines established between the United States
and Brazil, for example, were executed to prevent spillover into the emerging
Brazilian economy. A move which, as stated by Brazilian Central Bank
President, Henrique Meirelles, showed the Federal Reserve's confidence in South
America's largest economy. 12 By September 2008, swap agreements had risen
from $290 billion to over $620 billion, seen in either new arrangements or
increases in swap authorization limits with the following banks: Bank of Canada,
BOE, Bank of Japan, National Bank of Denmark, ECB, Bank of Norway,
Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank of Sweden, and Swiss National Bank.128 Smaller
swap lines to support the provision of U.S. dollar liquidity were established with
the Central Bank of Mexico, the Bank of Korea, and the Monetary Authority of
Singapore for up to $30 billion each.129 Following Washington's lead in fostering
interbank cooperation, central banks in Japan and China arranged swap lines with
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South Korea in an effort to stabilize the Korean currency, the won.so An
argument may be made, however, that China's actions are not tantamount to
actual cooperation for the sake of global stability, but part of Beijing's growing
desire to moderate the role of the U.S. dollar as the global currency.'"' This
offshore liquidity allowed Federal Reserve counterparties to fund the U.S. dollar
liabilities of the banks they supervise, with the peak of line usage being 583
billion in December 2008.132
Establishing foreign exchange swap lines has been prominent in central
banking cooperative measures but not the sole instrument used. Utilizing interest
rates to promote monetary policy objectives has also important , with the ability
to control short-term interest rates a basic Federal Reserve policy tool used to
influence the economy and to spur private sector borrowing. While an important
strategy, it has not always been executed in a coordinated fashion. The Federal
Reserve and the ECB, for example, have taken opposite approaches: with the
Federal Reserve aggressively cutting rates, while the ECB reacts less quickly
with an overall appreciation for the possible inflationary impact.
In spite of the initially differing monetary views, a coordinated joint interest
rate effort did eventually materialize, with many commentators stating that the
simultaneous reductions of interest rates from the key central banks exemplified
the height of deliberate central bank cooperation. According to Bernanke:
[O]n October 8 (2008), the Federal Reserve announced a reduction in its
policy interest rate jointly with five other major central banks-the Bank
of Canada, the Bank of England, the ECB, Sveriges Riksbank, and the
Swiss National Bank. . . [the] joint action was motivated by the abatement
of inflationary pressures and increased indications of economic slowing
in our respective economies. In addition, the coordinated rate cut was
intended to send a strong signal to the public and to markets of our
resolve to act together to address global economic challenges.13
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Bryant drives home the importance of coordination of short-term interest rate
movements: "Domestic goals and needs differ across the major countries. Given
cross-border contagion and disruptive herd behavior, however, consultations
among central banks leading to mutually-timed announcements of monetarypolicy actions could help to restore confidence."'3 The challenges of a low
interest rate strategy come from the difficulty in maintaining those rates,
especially for the United States and Japan, for example, which as of March, 2010
continue to hold their rates close to zero as part of a Keynesian macroeconomic
interest rate policy. Historically, the inability to hold interest rates has had
adverse impacts on a struggling economy, as shown by the Great Depression and
experience in Japan during the 1990s.
While the South African G-20 Summit can be credited as the start of
formalized collaborative efforts, subsequent meetings in Washington D.C. in
November 2007 and London in April 2008 promoted the idea of explicit central
bank cooperation. The Washington Declaration presented after the conclusion of
the summit spoke to key areas such as determining the root causes of the crisis;
actions to be taken; reforming financial markets; tasking monetary officials; and
renewing commitments to an open global economy."' Fundamental to the
concluding theme at the summit was that central bank cooperation was effective
in combating the crisis. Despite its considerable shared optimism, it was pointed
out that nothing tangible truly resulted from the Washington meeting, with
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez calling it a meeting of the rich and "a waste
of time."'16 Not withstanding Chavez's anti-capitalist rhetoric, Johnson called the
summit unnecessary, given the results: "This is plain-vanilla stuff they could
have agreed on without holding a meeting."1 7 A successful counterargument to
Johnson's statement, however, might focus on the intangibles that an image of
solidarity presents, and on the need to continue to make unifying statements
followed by action.
A central theme of the G-20 London Summit was the reaffirming of the
importance of the IMF's role in the current financial crisis. By allocating an
additional $1 trillion to augment the IMF's lending capability, the G-20
reaffirmed the IMF's responsibility as economic forecaster, policy advisor,
global lender (liquidity provider), and the organization charged with maintaining
economic surveillance. An important aspect of the London summit was a
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recognition that the crisis had deepened since the Washington meeting and that
stimulus packages, on their own merit, were not panaceas for the financial
crisis.' Much of the focus was on the importance of establishing cross-border
crisis management structure by the FSB, IMF, World Bank, and central banks, in
addition to the creation of an early crisis warning system by the IMF and FSB.
U.S. Treasury secretary Tim Geithner, among others, has expressed doubt,
however, whether central banks or regulators can legitimately provide such an
early warning system.'4 While unity was the underscored theme, there was
friction as to how the crisis should be handled, with some leaders wary of
unprecedented state spending and the long-term ramifications of the packages
discussed. Then Japanese prime minister Taro Aso, in signaling his country's
new found readiness to take a leading role in cooperative actions to stem the
crisis, addressed the differences in the views concerning the spending packages
in simple pragmatic fashion: "There are countries that understand the importance
of fiscal mobilization and there are some countries that do not."l4 1
C. Summary
As has been shown, central bank coordination is not at all new, and has
existed between industrialized nations for more than a century. The aftermath of
the September 11', 2001 terrorist attacks are often used as a benchmark for
international central bank cooperation. The level of collaborative action between
states in the context of the more recent global financial crisis was, however,
exceedingly more complex and far reaching than at any other time in modern
history.
Responses by central banks have included varying combinations of liquidity
provision, interest rate cuts, and other policy initiatives from other actors, such as
deposit and/or debt guarantees and capital injections. While utilized domestically
at first, the need to coordinate such strategies became all too apparent during the
early stages of the crisis. Parak of the Bank of Sweden has reflected on the
importance of coordinating such initiatives:
Due to the global scope of the crisis, countries must coordinate measures
to solve it. Separate national solutions could result in higher crisis
management costs than would otherwise be the case. In all of these areas
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where supervision and regulation need to be improved, they must be
coordinated and harmonized internationally.142
Collaborative efforts tested both the resolve and resources of leading central
banks. While the efforts have led to greatly swollen central bank balance sheets,
there have been positive results, albeit at times difficult to ascertain clearly, with
each G-20 member now emerging from recession.
While there continues to be conflicting global opinions on the mechanics of
how the crisis should have been handled, the issues are not at all imprisoned in
the present tense. The issues of debate are no longer confined to analyzing which
central bank intervention initiative is appropriate under which conditions, but
have also turned towards how these initiatives will be disengaged; in essence,
what exit strategies exist? Rogoff suggests that central banks must eventually end
their support and allow a normal consolidation within the banking industry. He
specifically addresses the idea that what has happened to the banking industry
cannot be pinned solely on speculative housing activity, but is more so evidence
of a fundamental shift within the financial industry.143 The IMF's Strauss-Kahn
has reiterated the importance of an exit strategy, specifically citing that
coordination is even more important during exit stages because of the difficult
political choices which must be made.'" Ben Bernanke, in a 10 page February
2010 statement, reiterated the fact that the Federal Reserve must start scaling
back the extraordinary measures taken at the onset of the crisis, but offered no

commensurate timetable.145
The focus on coordination is not only evident from the strategies presently
utilized by central banks but also regarding efforts to prevent such a crisis in the
future by establishing integrated surveillance and response measures. Thus, the
focus on coordination has correctly shifted to a more forward-looking
perspective. One area where a forward-looking perspective is apparent is that of
governance. In analyzing the crisis it has become evident that regulatory issues
were at its epicenter. From a transactional perspective, inadequate regulatory
structures allowed reckless issuance of credit without appropriate due diligence.
Individual nations are now aware of the need for tighter financial regulation.
Thus it may be asserted that the importance of joint cooperative measures have
been advantageous, eclipsed only by the importance of future central bank
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cooperation in defining regulatory and oversight supervisory protocols. With a
growing perception that the worst has passed, the view is now to promote
international practices with a preventative objective. The very nature of the
definition of "crisis," however, necessitates an element of the unknown and
unexpected. Nonetheless, central banks are focused on preventing or mitigating
damages by maintaining close coordinated efforts.
VI. LOOKING FORWARD
Although central bank cooperation takes place today through many forums,
including the G-20, IMF and FSB, the only international institution devoted
purely to central bank cooperation is the BIS. It has fifty-six member central
banks, representing a large percentage of the global economy. In addition to
research, meetings and events, and financial services support to central banks, the
BIS hosts a number of central bank committees. These include the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, the Committee on the Global Financial
System, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, and the Irving
Fisher Committee (dealing with central banks statistics), essentially covering the
major roles and functions of modern central banks. In addition, the BIS hosts
several related, but independent, organizations: the FSB, International
Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) and the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). At the same time, the BIS is an unusual
international institution; its members are not governments but rather central
banks, often with high levels of independence. It is, thus, more akin to a private
members' club for central banks, rather than a traditional international
organization, or even an industry or self-regulatory organization. Despite its
unusual international character, the BIS has served as an effective forum for
central bank cooperation for almost eighty years, and few if any of its members
would prefer any other structure.'4
At the same time, the BIS is not the only international central bank
organization; there are several regional organizations, with the ESCB in the E.U.
by far the most formal and developed. 147 In addition, central banks in Asia have
organized a number of organizations, 4 8 with the Executives' Meeting of East
Asia Pacific Central Bank (EMEAP) and South East Asian Central Banks
Research and Training Centre (SEACEN) supporting cooperation in policy areas
and training respectively.
Simmons has asserted that central bank cooperation is dependent on central
bankers agreeing on theory; a consensus on goals with a social paradigm; the
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technical and institutional ability to reach those goals; and an open political
environment which fosters cooperation between international central banks.149
Central banks today agree on the problems and challenges they face, and are
starkly aware that overcoming complex hurdles requires a joint response. Further,
while opinions vary on how to address the issues, there is a consensus among
central bankers regarding overriding goals and their importance to their
respective societies. Finally, the political and diplomatic will of the leading
economies are inherently linked to the success of any initiative. Weighing these
factors against Simmons's prerequisites, it can be argued that central banks are
now at a level of cooperation not previously seen. It can also be anticipated that
central banks from around the world will continue to work together to address
new shocks and challenges.
Looking forward, the global financial crisis has put into stark relief the twin
roles of central banks: monetary stability and financial stability. While many
central banks (including arguably the Federal Reserve and BOE) focused mainly
on monetary policy and less on financial stability before the global financial
crisis, going forward, central banks will be highly focused on financial stability.
In this context, a number of issues have arisen: the need for effective
macroprudential surveillance, comprehensive coverage of prudential regulatory
systems, mechanisms to address crises (such as liquidity mechanisms), and
systems to resolve crises which take place (such as deposit insurance and
financial institution insolvency systems). In the context of a global financial
system, domestic central banks are unable to address these issues entirely on their
own. As a result, cooperation mechanisms in all areas are likely to be enhanced.
Beyond financial stability-as was the case with the development of the euro
and the ECB in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods international
monetary system in the 1970s, and the development of the initial steps in East
Asia following the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s-countries and
regions are increasingly considering mechanisms to address monetary stability in
a global context. These issues are likely to foreshadow increasing formality in the
context of monetary arrangements.
Finally, the global financial crisis has seen the emergence of the PBOC as a
new leading player. As the central bank for the world's third largest economy
(after the United States and the Eurozone) and the world's largest holder of
foreign reserves, it seems likely that the character of international central bank
cooperation will change with the PBOC gaining influence similar to the Federal
Reserve and the ECB, and of potentially greater significance than the BOE and
the Bank of Japan.
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